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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
The issue presented in appellant's Appeal is whether there
is sufficient evidence to support the Court's finding that the
plaintiffs were employed by the defendant, and that the
agreements signed by the defendant are binding.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents concur in the comments made in appellant's Brief
under the headings "Statement and Nature of the Case" and
"Disposition in the Lower Court".

However, additional facts are

presented herewith to give the Court a clearer picture of the
evidence which the trial court relied upon in making its
findings and entering judgment against the appellant.
When Karen Edwards began working for Larry Groover in 1980,
she was initially paid by an entity known as Groover Financial
Management.

She was not aware of the structure of this business

entity (Record 75-76).

When she was hired, Larry Groover told

Karen that the bonuses she would earn would be more than her
salary (R. 75). In late 1981 or early 1982 Groover promised
Edwards, among others, that four of them would divide equally ten
percent (10%) of the renewals that Groover personally.received
from the insurance policies he wrote with A. L. Williams (R. 7778).

However, such bonuses were never paid (R. 79).
In furtherance of the initial promises made to Karen

Edwards at the time of her hiring, in December of 1980 Groover's
employees received a written promise that they would receive
bonuses, the source of which would be a percentage of Groover's
renewals (R. 87, Plaintiff's Exhibit 6). The defendant signed
4

this document (R. 87, 245). Again in late 1982 or early 1983,
the defendant again promised certain employees, including
Karen Edwards and Judy Smith, ten percent (10%) of the profits of
an entity known as Golden Tiger Energy as bonuses for the
employees1 work (R. 79). Karen Edwards relied on these promises
(R. 80), and the defendant admits that his employees relied on
his promises (R. 255-256).
Karen Edwards and Judy Smith became dissatisfied with the
working conditions and the unkept promises and in 1983 Karen
Edwards approached Groover, seeking to terminate her employment
and to compromise her claims for promised but unpaid bonuses.
Accordingly, she had a conversation with the defendant wherein
the parties reached an agreement on a compromise of Karen's claim
(R. 89-90, Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, which is included in
Appellant's Brief as Addendum Exhibit "B").

During this

conversation the parties negotiated a figure of $7,500 in cash to
be paid to plaintiff (R. 92). Mr. Groover admitted that this
figure was fairly negotiated (R. 180). One of the terms of each
of the agreements was that Smith and Edwards would each receive a
specified amount of cash to later purchase stock in an entity
known as San Saba Energy (Plaintiff's Exhibits 5 and 8).

Both

Edwards and Smith testified that they had been told by Groover
that the stock would be released shortly and that it was "never
an if, it was just a when" (R. 90-91, R. 164). Karen Edwards
testified that had she known that San Saba's stock might not have
been issued, she would have insisted upon cash in the full amount
(R. 91-92).

5

Karen Edwards received $2,500 cash from the defendant
and Judy Smith received $1,000 from the defendant as specified
in their respective agreements (R. 93, R. 165).
Karen Edwards and Judy Smith assigned their claims to
Porter & Bettridge, a bonded collection agency, who brought this
action to collect on the unpaid agreements.
Although appellant cites his own testimony to the contrary,
Karen Edwards testified that everyone who worked in the office,
including herself and the employees of Managed Accounting
Services, took orders from Larry Groover (R. 82). Further, Judy
Smith testified that she always considered herself an employee of
Larry Groover (R. 153).
During the three years of her employment with the
defendant, Karen Edwards worked for several entities other than
the one she was initially hired for, and all entities were
directed by Larry Groover personally (R. 80-82).

During this

period of time Karen Edwards and Judy Smith received paychecks
from several different entities on any given pay day (R. 83,
153).

In fact, on February 4, 1982 Karen Edwards received her

semi-monthly salary in the form of checks from six different
entities (R. 83-84, Plaintiff's Exhibit 7). Larry Groover was
directly responsible for this piece-meal approach to the wage
payments (R. 85).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondents submit that there is sufficient and substantial
evidence upon which the Court based its ruling.

Specifically,

Edwards and Smith presented evidence that Groover hired them
personally, benefitted personally from their work, and paid each
6

of them from a variety of corporate entities during the course of
their employment.

This evidence supports the trial court's

finding that Groover is personally liable on the subject
agreements.
Edwards and Smith also presented evidence that supported
the trial court's finding that the agreements signed by the
defendant were in settlement and an accord and satisfaction of
the potential claim of these employees for unpaid bonuses that
were promised by Groover and relied upon by the employees, but
were never made.
Finally, there was ample evidence to support the trial
court's finding that there was no condition precedent existing in
the subject agreements that would justify further non-payment
under the terms of the agreement.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has stated:
[o]n appeal we apply the traditional rules of review:
we assume that the trial court believed those aspects
of the evidence which may be deemed to support his
finding and judgment; and we survey the evidence in
the light favorable thereto.
Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228, at 1229
(Utah 1975).

In addition, the standard of review in determining

whether the subject contracts included conditions precedent is:
to review the evidence and all inferences that may be
drawn therefrom in a light most supportative of the
findings of the crier of fact. The findings and
judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed when
they are based on substantial, competent, admissible
evidence.
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) (quoting Car
Doctor. Inc. v. Belmont, 635 P.2d 82, 83-4 (Utah 1981).
7

II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT AN
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS CREATED.

This action arose out of a dispute between the appellant
employer and two of his employees as to certain bonuses that had
been promised to the employees.

One of the sources of these

bonuses were Mr. Groover's personal funds.
As the evidence recited above clearly shows, during the
years that Karen Edwards and Judy Smith worked for the defendant
they never received any of the promised bonuses from A. L.
Williams overrides, which went directly and personally to Mr.
Groover, or Golden Tiger/San Saba.

Disappointed and determined

to leave Groover's employ, Edwards and Smith, individually and
separately, met with Groover to discuss the value of the
undelivered, but promised, bonuses.

The employees desired an

immediate payment of cash but Groover would not agree to it.
Instead, an upfront partial payment of cash was made and an
agreement was made that a subsequent payment of cash would be
made at a later date.

The employees each drew up a typed

agreement indicating the remaining amount of cash owed them and
included the promissory condition that they would purchase stock
in San Saba upon receipt of the cash.
agreements signed them.

All parties to the

Each of these agreements became an

accord.
Accord and satisfaction arises where the parties to
an agreement resolve that a given performance by one
party thereto, offered in substitution of the
performance originally agreed upon, will discharge the
obligation created under the original agreement.

8

Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction_co_r 701 P.2d 1078, 1082
(Utah 1985); Lawrence Construction Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d
382, 384 (Utah 1982); Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610
P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980).

This Court, in Sugarhouse Finance,

further outlined the essential elements of an accord and
satisfaction as:

" ( D a proper subject matter; (2) competent

parties; (3) an assent or meeting of the minds of the parties;
and (4) a consideration given for the accord."

Sugarhouse

Finance, 610 P.2d at 1372.
Although an oral agreement as to the bonuses already
existed, there had been no performance on the part of Groover.
Upon Groover's Motion to Dismiss during trial, the trial court
found that the plaintiff's evidence created a cause of action
against Groover (R. 273-274, attached as Addendum Exhibit "A"
herein).

Such a cause of action is the proper subject matter for

an accord and satisfaction.

Whether the cause of action had

merit or not is not known nor is it important for "it is not
necessary for the dispute to be well-founded, so long as it is in
good faith."

Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730

(Utah 1985) (citing Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 P.2d 1073,
1076 (1935)).

All of the parties agreed that the employees had

not been paid what they were worth and that the bonuses were
established to make up for that (R. 75, R. 306-307).
As to the second element required to establish an accord
and satisfaction, there has been no argument by Groover that any
of the parties were other than competent nor is there any
evidence that such is the case.
The third element required is an assent by the parties.
9

Such assent is established by the parties1 signatures to the
agreements, introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibits 5 and 8.

Edwards

and Smith were the parties who memorialized on paper the verbal
understanding and agreement that each of them had with the
defendant.

Groover, an attorney-at-law (R. 249), read,

understood, and signed the documents. Although Groover's
testimony is self-serving on the issue of an alleged condition
precedent, it does further establish that the terms of the
agreements were negotiated (R. 248, 252).
The fourth essential element is legal consideration.

The

doctrine of accord and satisfaction requires that there be an
actual dispute or disagreement over the amount due and that the
parties enter into an agreement that one party will pay, and the
other party will accept, a certain amount as a compromise of
their differences and in satisfaction of claimed amount. Tates,
535 P.2d 1229-30. This Court has established that when a bona
fide dispute is settled as to an unliquidated or disputed amount
owed, such settlement constitutes valid legal consideration.
E.g., Golden Key Realty, 699 P.2d, at 733; Cannon v.
Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383, 1386 (Utah 1977).
As additional consideration, Edwards and Smith gave up the
cause of action that each of them had against the defendant based
upon promissory estoppel, although neither was aware of the legal
term for it (e.g., R. 89-90).

After a fashion, Mr. Groover

testified that he voluntarily promised certain bonuses to these
employees and that they relied on those promises (R. 255-256).
There can be no doubt that Groover intended that his employees

10

rely upon his representations since he made them at the time he
hired them and at subsequent intervals when the question of
raises and compensation would arise.

He was attempting to obtain

their loyalty, labor and skills at a greatly reduced salary and
hoped that the representations made would elicit such an outcome.
For a time, it did.

Karen Edwards1 testimony confirmed that the

employees relied upon Mr. Groover's promises (R. 80). As a
result, they detrimentally relied upon his representations and
remained in his employ at a substantially inadequate salary.
Such a detrimental reliance became a good faith claim which the
employees gave up at the time of the accord with the defendant.
These elements of an accord and satisfaction were clearly
and sufficiently established in the trial court.

The trial court

found that the employees each entered into a "settlement
agreement" with Groover, which obligated him, personally and
individually, to pay the amounts stated on the agreements.
(Findings of Fact, R. 44-46).
Because the trial court found that an accord and
satisfaction had occurred, the Court rejected Groover's testimony
(R. 186) that the bonuses and promises to pay were gifts. A gift
is defined as "a voluntary transfer of property to another made
gratuitously and without consideration."
619 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).

Black's Law Dictionary

The trial court found that there had

been consideration given for the agreements (R. 186). Therefore
they could not have been a gift from the defendant.
III.

THE PLAINTIFFS WERE HIRED AND WORKED FOR
THE DEFENDANT.

The employees testified that they were interviewed and

11

hired by Groover.

(R. 75-76, R. 149). Edwards and Smith

received their paychecks from any of seven different corporations
or entities which were directed and controlled by Groover.

The

testimony and evidence establish that Mr. Groover personally
hired the plaintiffs.

It was further established that Mr.

Groover, individually and personally, signed the agreements with
Karen Edwards and Judy Smith.

There is not indication that he

was acting in a corporate capacity.

Nor is it insignificant that

Mr. Groover was not a corporate officer of some of the
corporations which paid the plaintiffs.

Testimony established

that regardless of the position he held in the company, Mr.
Groover was in charge of the entities for which the plaintiffs
worked (R. 80-82).
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE
ISSUANCE OF THE SAN SABA STOCK WAS NOT A
CONDITION PRECEDENT.
Groover asserts that the agreements drawn up by Edwards and
Smith and signed by the parties contained a condition precedent;
that the subsequent payment of $5,000 to Karen and $1,000 to Judy
was conditioned upon San Saba stock "going public".

However,

neither agreement, expressly or impliedly, stated anything about
the "going public" of San Saba stock nor was there any evidence
that the agreement was based upon that condition.

It is well

established that a condition precedent "must appear expressly or
by clear implication."
(Utah 1978).

Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 953

There is no argument from the employees that a

promissory condition existed as to the San Saba stock, i,e., that
Edwards and Smith would purchase the stock at the time they were
given the cash.

That is exactly what their understanding was
12

when they memorialized the agreement on paper.

They wanted to

purchase the stock because Groover had convinced them that by
investing in the stock they would be able to increase the value
of the stock by a hundred fold and that it would be a valuable
investment (R. 164). There was never any conversation between
Groover and Edwards or Smith about the possibility of the San
Saba stock not "going public" (R. 90-91, R. 164). The employees
included the promissory condition of purchasing the stock with
the cash paid by Groover so that they would in fact be able to
acquire it at the later date.

"A simple statement or stipulation

in a contract is not necessarily a condition to a party's duty to
performance."

Id.,

What is controlling is the "parties1

intent, which is derived from 'a fair and reasonable construction
of the language used in light of all circumstances when [the
parties] executed the contract1."

Kimball, 699 P.2d at 716,

(quoting Creer v. Thurman, 581 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978)).
Edward's agreement with Groover stated "[t]he 5,000
is to be paid in cash with the means to purchase the stock on a
resubscription agreement, expected to take place approximately 1
June 1983" (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5). There is no indication other
than from Groover that Karen was inferring that the payment of
the $5,000 was conditioned on the going public of the San Saba
stock.

Rather, she agreed to purchase the San Saba stock upon

receipt of the $5,000.
Smith's agreement with the defendant stated "I [Larry
Groover] will give $[1],000 cash to Judy Smith to purchase San
Saba stock, per our employment termination settlement of April
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28, 1983" (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8). Again, there is no indication
that the payment to Judy was predicated upon the going public of
the San Saba stock.

As a result, the trial court found that the

issuance of the San Saba stock was not a condition precedent to
the obligation to pay

(Findings of Fact, R. 44-46).
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, there was substantial,
competent, believable evidence admitted at trial supporting the
trial court's findings and this Court should affirm the trial
court's decision, dismiss Groover's appeal and award respondent's
their costs.
Further, respondants believe that Groover's appeal is
patently frivolous and respondants should be awarded just
damages, including attorney's fees, pursuant to Rule 33, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

*

day of June, 1986.

HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.C.
Attorney for Respondents
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ADDENDUM

16

1 ' contract to claim that they did not know that a future event j
2

might no t happen, is beyond reason.

It goes along with

3

the question I asked, whether or not they considered Mr.

4

Groover a prophet to foretell the future.

5

the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that there

6

are very few people who claim to have the ability to foreteli

7

the future, to be able to judge stock markets going up and

8

down, to tell what the S.E.C. can do, and that type of

9

informat ion.

I believe that

And I don't think Mr. Groover ever claimed

10

to have that power when he was negotiating with these indi- i

11

viduals.
The event is a future event.

12

That's clear from

13

the face of the contract.

They didn't need to be told that

14

a future event might not happen by the mere fact that it's

15

a future event.

16

any rational person knowledge that there's a contingency

17

and the thing might not occur.

That in and of itself is enough to give

18

THE COURT:

Thank you.

19

Well, on the issue of consideration, I think

20

from the evidence presented so far, at least if I believe

21

the testimony of the Plaintiffs, there was consideration.

22 |

I don't think it's a question of past consideration, because

23

I think what they were giving up is something they had right

24

then, wh ich was sort of a cause of action for past compen-

25

sation.

It may not have been a valid one, may not have

205

1

prevailed.

2

have any merit.

3

They settle cases all the time that don't
I think at least they felt they had some-

J thing coming in bonuses that they had been promised.

4

at that point Mr. Groover would have said well, I'm not

5 | going to pay you a dime.

6
7

That

Forget it.

I think they probably

may have had a cause of action at that point or at least
j would have pursued it in some way or had an opportunity

8 I to.

And I think that's what they gave up in return for

9 I their agreement.
10

So I think there was consideration.

At least,

11 | if I believe their version of the transaction,
12

And in terms of the condition precedent, I don't

13| think it's all that clear.

But as I read these things from

14

the testimony presented, again, if I believe what they say,

15

I don't think that this company going public was considered

16

to be a condition precedent.

17

money, and they had the further opportunity to buy the San

18

Saba Stock.

19

opportunity, and I think as I read the statute, they would

20

have been entitled to the case in any event.

21

to deny the motion and allow you to put on your case, Mr.

22

I Hanna.

23

I

24

25

They were going to get the

They give the money to the Defendant, that

So I'm

MR. HANNA:

Thank you, Your Honor

THE COURT:

Do you want to call your first

going

witness?

?0fi

